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Intra-Family Immunities and the Law
of Torts in Ohio
lohn E. Sullivan
The author seeks to clarify intra-family immunity, a rapidly develop-
ing area of tort law, by tracing the evolution of parental and interspousal
immunities, by an exhaustive analysis of four important Ohio cases, and
by an in-depth comparison of Ohio tort law with that of several other jur-
isdictions. In citing modern developments and exceptions which have
contributed to a gradual elimination of the various immunities, Professor
Sullivan criticizes the recent judicial reasoning which has attempted to
justify their existence. Raising several germane and, as yet, unanswered
questions essential to an understanding of the immunity area, the author
sets forth his views on the future of tort litigation in Ohio.
CHE RADICAL change in tort law during the last two decadesI has wrought an expansion of liability in personal injury litiga-
tion. Many viewpoints which once were solely the opinions of aca-
demic scholars as to what the law should be have become either
generally accepted rules or at
least the trend of authority.Tfin AUTuoR (B.S.S., John Carroll Uni- For example, in most American
versity, LL.B., Western Reserve Univer-
sity) is a Professor of Law at Franklin jurisdictions, the unborn child
Law School, Capital University, and his is now allowed to sue for pre-
teaching specialties include Torts, Real
and Personal Property, Suretyship, and natal injuries.' Courts with
Mortgages. greater frequency allow recov-
ery for intentional2 or negli-
gent infliction of mental suffering when unaccompanied by contem-
poraneous physical injury.' The child trespasser is now distinguished
from the ordinary trespasser and is thus given protection in some of
the industrial states which had previously refused to recognize the
attractive nuisance doctrine.4 The doctrines of res ipsa loquitur
and informed consent6 have extended recovery in medical malprac-
1 See PROSSER, TORTS § 56 (3d ed. 1964).
2 E.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282
(1952); Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961); Samms v. Ecdes, 11
Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961).
a PRoSSER, op. cit. supra note 1, 5 55, at 348-49.
4 Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 427, 433 (1959).
5 See generally Adamson, Medical Malpractice: Misuse of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 46
MwN. L. REv. 1043 (1962); Rubsamen, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California Medical Mal-
practice Law - Expansion of a Doctrine to the Bursting Point, 14 STAN. L. REV. 251
(1962); Note, Malpractice and Medical Testimony, 77 HARV. L REV. 333 (1963).
6 See generally Oppenheim, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, 11 CLEV.-
MARl. L. REV. 249 (1962); Note, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1445 (1962).
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tice litigation. Since 1950, several states have held that a wife may
recover for loss of consortium against one who negligently injures
her husband,' and, of course, the most noteworthy example of the
expanding nature of tort principles in the post-war era has been in
the area of products liability law.8
However, not the least of the substantive changes in tort law
has resulted from a re-examination by courts as well as legislatures
of the policy factors which had previously exempted from liability
otherwise tortious defendants. In the past twenty years, govern-
mental9 and charitable bodies"° have experienced curtailment and in
some cases elimination of immunity from tort liability. The desire
by courts to meet changing conditions has resulted in many illogical
distinctions in dealing with these various immunities, especially in
the numerous post-war decisions concerning the intra-family immu-
nities. Many of these decisions have created in the law of torts
what a Connecticut court referred to as a "conglomerate of para-
doxical and irreconcilable judicial decisions."'" It is the purpose of
this article to evaluate, within the context of the changing nature of
tort liability, the Ohio Supreme Court decisions which have involved
the problem of intra-family immunity.
I. POST-WAR TORT LIABILITY IN OHIO
As in other states, tort law has not remained static in Ohio dur-
ing the post-war period. The Ohio Supreme Court has not hesitated
on occasion to overturn common law precedent and to espouse
newer and more liberal views after it determined that an extension
of liability in a particular area was both desirable and publicly ac-
7 Authorities are collected in Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of America, 46 N.J.
82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965); Note, Judicial Treatment of Negligent Invasion of Consortium,
61 COLJM. L. REv. 1341 (1961).8 At the 1964 proceedings of the American Law Institute relating to the adoption of
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS, § 402A (1965), Dean Prosser, its chief author,
spoke in favor of the strict liability in tort theory:
I would venture to predict that in another 50 years this has fair chances of
becoming a majority rule in the United States, because this is next to the lia-
bility for prenatal injuries - this is the speediest development in the law of
torts that I have encountered in my lifetime, as well as being one of the most
spectacular. 41 AL PROCEEDINGS 351 (1965).
9 Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89
(1961), modified on appeal, 57 Cal. 2d 488, 370 P.2d 325, 20 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1962);
Seavey, Liberal Construction and Tort Liability of the Federal Government, 67 HARv.
L. REv. 994 (1954).
10 Thornton & McNiece, Torts, 1965 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 411, 414-15 (1966).
"1 Overlock v. Ruedemann, 147 Conn. 649, 654, 165 A.2d 335, 338 (1960).
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ceptable. Between 1948 and 1958, Ohio recognized: the right of
the unborn viable child to sue after birth for its negligently in-
flicted prenatal injuries,' the right of a patient to sue a charitable
hospital for the negligent conduct of its employees,"8 the right of a
person to recover for an invasion of privacy,' 4 and the right of an
ultimate consumer to recover against a manufacturer for personal in-
juries, even in the absence of privity of contract, if an express war-
ranty can be found on the basis of the wording of a label on a sealed
package.")
Although such decisions were hailed by the proponents of ex-
panded liability, the Ohio Supreme Court evidenced a slower and at
times a more conservative attitude towards new developments in
other fields of tort law than did courts in other states. Eight years
after the court held that an express warranty might be discovered
on a package label,1" it finally (and logically) reached the conclu-
sion that a manufacturer might be sued by a third party not in
privity with it on the basis of an implied warranty." After the re-
moval of the charitable hospital immunity, the court soon an-
nounced that such removal was not to be interpreted as a general
abolition of all charitable immunity;' municipal governmental im-
munity, for instance, has withstood the attacks of its critics in Ohio
despite a gradual overturn in other jurisdictions."9 The right of
privacy, recognized by the court in 1956,20 was not to be extended
in 1964 to a case in which minor children of an allegedly promiscu-
ous man asserted that they were injured by the public notoriety
attaching to the extramarital affair between the defendant and their
father."' In the same action, the court refused to grant to such
children the right to sue the defendant for alienation of their father's
affection even though Ohio has for years recognized a spouse's right
'
2 Wiliams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334
(1949).
13 Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
14Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956).
15 Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio Sr. 244, 147 NXB.2d 612 (1958).
16 Ibid.
17 Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
18Gibbon v. YWCA, 170 Ohio St. 280, 164 N.E.2d 563 (1960).
19 This trend is discussed in Hack v. City of Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 387-88, 189
N.E.2d 857, 860 (1963).
2 0 Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956).
2 1Kane v. Quigley, 1 Ohio St. 2d 1, 203 N.B.2d 338 (1964).
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to maintain such a suit.22 This latter case was consistent with an
earlier denial by the court to review a lower court decision in which
a child was denied damages for loss of consortium resulting from the
defendant's negligent infliction of injury to the father.23
Such expansions or contractions of the ambit of tort liability by
the Ohio Supreme Court are relevant to an understanding of the
Ohio intra-family immunity suits of the same era, four of which will
be the subject of this artidcle. The conflicting policy factors raised
and debated in the cases mentioned above are essentially the same
ones that confronted the court when it ruled on intra-family immu-
nities: (1) should court decisions strictly follow the doctrine of stare
decisis and common law precedent and resist venturing into the es-
tablishment of new legal principles for charitable institutions, city
governments, and manufacturers, as well as for family members;
(2) would a judicial change in a particular case adversely affect an
established relationship formerly given preferred status by the law
on public policy grounds, such as a charity and its beneficiary, a doc-
tor and his patient, or a husband and his wife; (3) if a court were to
allow a child to sue for its prenatal injuries, an adult for mental dis-
turbance, or a minor for the tortious acts of its parent, would such a
court be in fact encouraging fraudulent and collusive suits which
would result in unconscionable raids on insurance companies; (4)
what would be the effect on the already overcrowded trial court
dockets if courts were to allow consumers to sue manufacturers on a
warranty theory, a patient his doctor for failure to warn of residual
effects of an operation, or a wife her husband for real or fanciful
wrongs; and (5) should not any radical departure from the estab-
lished public policy of the state, such as removing municipal tort
immunity, expanding the concept of consortium, or allowing a hus-
band to sue his spouse, more properly be considered within the prov-
ince of the legislature rather than the courts.
The extent to which Ohio has participated in the trend toward
expanded tort liability in this post-war era has, of course, depended
upon the answers which the Ohio Supreme Court, either expressly
or impliedly, has given to these questions. Such answers have also
influenced the present status of the law in this state concerning intra-
family immunities.
22 Id. at 4, 203 N.E.2d at 340.
2 Gibson v. Johnston, 144 N.E.2d 310 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956), appeal dismissed,
166 Ohio St. 288, 141 N.E.2d 767 (1957).
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I. EVOLUTION OF INTRA-FAmILY IMMUNITY
A. Parental Immunity
Early in 1952, the Ohio Supreme Court in Signs v. Signs24 ren-
dered its first decision on the family immunity issue. In this case a
seven-year-old boy sued a partnership of which his father and an-
other man were the only members. It was alleged that the boy
was burned by a fire originating in a negligently maintained gasoline
pump that was used in the partnership business. The trial court
entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant, but
this was reversed by the court of appeals.25 The Ohio Supreme
Court, in unanimously affirming the appellate decision, stated in the
syllabus: "A parent in his business or vocational capacity is not im-
mune from a personal-tort action by his unemancipated minor
child. 20
However, the opinion written by Judge James Stewart was much
broader than the rule stated in the syllabus. He analyzed the entire
periphery of the parental immunity question, pointing out that pa-
rental protection from suit by an unemancipated child was not based
on old common law precedent which would have bound the court
in the area of interspousal immunity. The immunity was intro-
duced in the United States by an 1891 Mississippi case which held
that a daughter could not sue her mother for false imprisonment."
The decision was based on the need for preserving domestic tran-
quility, a principle which the court stated was founded upon sound
public policy." No common law precedent was cited by the Mis-
sissippi court, and Judge Stewart was not impressed, 9 although the
decision had generally been followed in the United States.3" Noting
that even in jurisdictions that supported this immunity rule, it had
been severely criticized in dissenting opinions, the judge cited many
exceptions which had developed to the rule.3 ' Three jurisdictions
had allowed a child's suit against the parent for negligence when the
24 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952).
25 Id. at 567, 103 NE.2d at 744.
26 Id. at 566, 103 NE.2d at 744.
27 Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
28Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
29 156 Ohio St. at 577, 103 N.E.2d at 748-49.
3o Id. at 569, 103 N.E.2d at 745. The judge further stated, however, that "of late
[the rule] ... has been viewed with suspicion and has been limited." Ibid.
31Id. at 569-73, 103 NE.2d at 745-47.
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parent was acting in a business rather than in a parental capacity.!
Decisions from other jurisdictions have established that a minor
child can sue his parent for a malicious tort"3 or the wrongful death
of the other parent, 4 and that he can sue the parent's employer for
the negligence of the agent-parent.3 5
In some of these cases, the existence of liability insurance pro-
tected the parent's personal assets from depletion by the payment of
adverse judgments.8 Judge Stewart did not accept the assertion that
this factor should affect the outcome of a tort controversy, arguing
rather that legal issues should be decided on the merits, irrespective
of whether a defendant was indemnified."T He quoted at some length
from Dean Prosser's writingsP8 in which both interspousal and pa-
rental immunity in tort were criticized." This noted authority
stressed that the earlier historical bar to interspousal suits, which
had been created at common law and which was based on the legal
identity of spouses, had no application to the parent and child rela-
tionship.4" He stated that the chief reason offered by modem courts
in support of interspousal immunity is the public interest in main-
taining domestic tranquility.4
Thus, courts deciding this latter type of suit should not be con-
fronted with the difficult problem of interpreting the effect of mar-
ried women's acts which have relieved the modern wife of many
of these common law legal impediments. Prosser further pointed
out that property suits had always been allowed between parent and
child and that there was good reason to believe that a personal tort
action between them would also lie in England.4" American courts
which had denied recovery in such suits, had done so in reliance
upon a variety of unconvincing reasons, such as an analogy of this
type of action and the interspousal one, the danger of fraud and
collusion, and the preservation of the equal distribution of the faro-
32 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Ad. 905 (1930); Worrell v. Worrell, 174
Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
33 Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950); accord, Mahnke v. Moore,
197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
34 Minkin v. Minkin, 336 Pa. 49, 7 A.2d 461 (1939).
35 Wright v. Wright, 229 N.C. 503, 50 S.E.2d 540 (1948).
36 Cases cited note 32 supra.
3 7 Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 573, 103 N.E.2d 743, 747 (1952).
38 PRoSSER, TORTS § 99 (1st ed. 1941).
89 156 Ohio St. at 573-75, 103 N.E.2d at 747-48.
40 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 38, § 99, at 905-06.
41 Ibid.
42 Id. § 99, at 905.
[Vol. 18: 447
INTRA-FAMILY IMMUNITIES
ily exchequer among the other family members.43 But the principal
argument advanced by the American courts against allowing parent
and child tort action had been, as in interspousal personal tort ac-
tions, the preservation of domestic tranquility.44 Logically, how-
ever, as Prosser pointed out,45 this same argument would have barred
emancipated children's suits against their parents in tort or tort ac-
tions between siblings, but it had not done so. Nor had it barred
suits between parent and child concerning their property rights.4"
Judge Stewart, impressed with this final point, stated:
It seems absurd to say that it is legal and proper for an uneman-
cipated child to bring an action against his parent concerning the
child's property rights yet be utterly without redress with reference
to injury to his person.
It is difficult to understand by what legerdemain of reason,
logic or law such a situation can exist or how it can be said that
domestic harmony would be undisturbed in one case and be upset
in the other.47
Judge Stewart finally turned his attention to the supposed dan-
ger of fraud and collusion inherent in this type of action when one
of the parties was insured.48 If, as he had previously argued, the
existence of insurance is not a valid reason for the removal of im-
munity where a parent was indemnified,49 it cannot logically be used
as an argument in support of recognition of immunity. He noted
that a very similar problem had confronted the insurance industry
earlier in the century with the advent of the automobile."0 In cases
involving the liability of an operator of an automobile to his in-
jured guest, it had been feared that recovery would open the door
to fraudulent and collusive suits because of the existence of lia-
bility insurance. However, the Ohio courts continued fo impose
negligence liability on drivers until the legislature passed the guest
statute" limiting liability to cases in which the host was guilty of
willful or wanton misconduct.5 " Similarly, if there were a general
feeling that parent and child litigation had created a climate for
43 Id. 5 99, at 906.
44 Ibd.
45Id. § 99, at 907.
46Ibid.
47 156 Ohio St. at 576, 103 N.E.2d at 748.
481bid.
49 Id. at 573, 103 N.E.2d at 747.
50 Id. at 576, 103 N.E.2d at 748.
5 1 O-O REv. CODE § 4515.02.
52 156 Ohio St. at 576, 103 N.E.2d at 748.
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fraudulent and collusive actions, the judge pointed out that the legis-
lature could abolish the child's right of action by statute, and if the
general assembly failed or was unwilling to act, the insurance com-
panies could always exclude such family coverage." Thus it can be
seen that the opinion of Judge Stewart was much broader than the
actual decision which held only that the child could sue the parent
for negligence in the latter's business or vocational capacity."M
The opinion is important because identical reasoning will lead
irresistibly to the conclusion that the two historical pillars which
have been used to support not only parental immunity but also in-
terspousal immunity are basically unstable. If the public interest in
maintaining domestic tranquility is not affected when an unemanci-
pated minor sues his father for a personal tort, then family har-
mony should likewise be unaffected if one spouse sues the other. It
was not long before the Ohio Supreme Court actually did reach
this result.
B. Interspousal Immunity
In June of 1952, four months after the Signs case, the court
decided Damm v. Elyria Lodge No. 465."5 The plaintiff-wife sued
a fraternal lodge, an unincorporated association, of which her hus-
band was a member. She joined the officers and trustees of the
lodge, but not her husband, as co-defendants. In her petition it was
alleged that she fell and was injured on the premises of the lodge
while attending a social function. 6 Negligence on the part of the
lodge was alleged in placing and maintaining an obstruction over
which she fell and in failing to give warning of the hazard. After
the suit was filed, the plaintiff's husband died, and the widow at-
tempted to file a supplementary petition apprising the court of this
fact. The case reached the Ohio Supreme Court after the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court which had granted a motion to
strike the supplemental petition and had sustained a demurrer to the
original petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action. 7
Judge Matthias adopted the plaintiff's statement of the question
to be decided: "May the wife of a deceased member of a voluntary
53 Id. at 576-77, 103 N.E.2d at 748.
54Id. at 566, 103 N.E.2d at 743 (syllabus).
55 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952).
56Id. at 108, 107 N.E.2d at 338-39.
57 Id. at 108-09, 107 N.E.2d at 339.
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association maintain an action in tort against the association for a
tort committed against her during her husband's lifetime?""8
The court unanimously held that the wife could maintain such
an action.59 First, the procedural question raised by the defendant
as to whether a representative type action could be authorized on
these facts was answered in the affirmative.6" Although the associa-
tion was not a legal entity for purpose of suit, it was a group of
individuals who were engaged in a common purpose and who were
too numerous for it to be practical to join them in a single action.
Thus, under the Ohio statute,"' joinder of the officers and trustees
as representatives of the group could be utilized, even though no
personal judgment was sought against such representatives.
Secondly, since the petition included all the other members of
the lodge, including the plaintiff's husband by representation, the
defendant argued that such an action constituted a suit in tort by a
wife against her husband, which was not permitted under Ohio
law."2 The court distinguished State v. Phillips3 which contained
dictum to the effect that the various statutes enacted by the general
assembly conferring rights upon married women which they did not
possess at common law were not intended by the legislature to jus-
tify interspousal actions in tort. 4  Judge Matthias pointed out that
the issue in Phillips was whether a wife could be convicted of lar-
ceny when she had appropriated her husband's personal property,
and that therefore the decision actually was limited to the criminal
liability of the wife under modern law.65 It in no way dealt with
the precise issue which was presently before the court: "the right of
a wife to recover damages for a tort committed by her husband."66
After quoting from Dean Prosser's text on the historical basis
of interspousal immunity,6" as had Judge Stewart in the Signs case,
Judge Matthias enumerated the various Ohio statutes which have
granted married women a separate legal identity and the power to
58 1d. at 109, 107 N.E.2d at 339.
59id. at 121, 107 N.E.2d at 344.
o Id. at 109-10, 107 N.E.2d at 339.
61 OHIo REv. CODE § 2307.21 is the present law.
62158 Ohio St. at 111, 107 N.E.2d at 340.
63 85 Ohio St. 317, 97 N.E. 976 (1912).
64 158 Ohio St. at 112, 107 N.E.2d at 340.
6 5 d. at 112-13, 107 N.E.2d at 340.
6 6 1d. at 113, 107 N.E.2d at 340-41.
67 PRossER, op. dit. supra note 38, § 99, at 898-900.
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own and control property.6" The judge cited both article 1, section
16 of the Ohio Constitution which grants to every person in Ohio
the right to have justice administered by the courts and Williams v.
Marion Rapid Transit, Inc.,9 which had relied upon this constitu-
tional provision." The Williams case, decided in 1949, had recog-
nized for the first time in Ohio the constitutional right of a child to
recover for negligently inflicted prenatal injuries. He also pointed
to the language in the statute which had removed the general dis-
qualification of a wife as a witness against her husband in criminal
proceedings7' as additional evidence of Ohio's recognition of a wife
as a separate legal entity."
As in all intra-family immunity actions, Judge Matthias also had
to answer the objection that the allowance of interspousal tort ac-
tions for personal injuries would interfere with the preservation of
domestic tranquility and family harmony. In so doing, he relied
upon Judge Stewart's opinion in Signs as well as upon Dean Pros-
ser's text. Judge Matthias noted that the Signs decision refused to
follow the majority rule in the United States in the parent and child
area and recognized instead a modern trend towards liberalizing the
immunity rule. 3  He found the same liberalizing trend in the hus-
band and wife litigation.74 It was noted that Prosser had impliedly
argued that it was illogical to say that domestic tranquility was not
disturbed when a wife sued her husband to enforce her property
rights but that family accord would be seriously injured when she
brought a personal tort action against him.75
Judge Matthias concluded that the Ohio constitution and the
various statutes discussed in the opinion had so modified the inter-
spousal immunity rule " that the plaintiff in the instant case might
even maintain this action against her husband individually; there-
68 158 Ohio St. at 115, 107 N.E.2d at 341-42, citing present OHIO REV. CODE S
2307.03-.08. See also OHIo REV. CODE § 2307.09, 2323.09.
69 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
70 158 Ohio St. at 116, 107 N.E.2d at 342.
7 1 OHIO REV. CODE § 2945.42 (formerly OHIO GEN. CODE § 13444-2).
72 158 Ohio St. at 117, 107 N.E.2d at 342-43.
73 Id. at 117-19, 107 N.E.2d at 343.
74 Id. at 117-18, 107 N.E.2d at 343.
75 Id. at 118-19, 107 N.E.2d at 343, citing PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 38, § 99,
at 903.
76 Judge Matthias cited an impressive list of cases from jurisdictions representing
the minority viewpoint which allowed the wife to recover against her husband for in-
tentional as well as negligent torts. 158 Ohio St. at 120, 107 N.E.2d at 344.
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fore, she could certainly maintain such action against the unincor-
porated association of which he was a member."
C. Establishment of the Minority View
A few observations are of interest concerning the Signs and
Elyria Lodge cases. Both decisions were supported by a unanimous
vote of the judges and, although, of course, the decisions must be
limited to the facts of each particular case, the court was adopting
what was then a definite minority viewpoint in the United States.
The two cases indicate that the membership of the Ohio Supreme
Court in 1952 did not hesitate to chart a new course in the law when
it felt that such a result was required by modern conditions. Nor
had there been any reluctance on its part in 1949, when the court
recognized the right of a child to sue for prenatal injuries." Sim-
ilarly, in 1956, charitable hospital immunity was to be removed 9
and in 1958 warranty recovery against a manufacturer was to be ex-
tended. 0 Thus, the two intra-family suits, along with these other
decisions, were further examples of the post-war expansion of tort
liability and the influence of the same on Ohio law.
Even though it was thought by some writers that the intra-
family bar was abolished in Ohio in both parental and interspousal
actions as a result of the Signs and Elyria Lodge cases,"' it must be
noted that neither case was a typical fact pattern in this type of tort
litigation. Most of the post-war cases that have reached the appel-
late courts in both parental and interspousal suits appear to have
77Id. at 121, 107 N.E.2d at 344.
7 8 Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
79 Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
8 0 Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
81 In reference to the holding in Signs, Robert C. Bensing, formerly of the faculty
of the Western Reserve Law School asserted:
The writer does not believe that the inclusion of the phrase "business or other
vocational capacity" is a limitation on the infant's right to bring suit against
his parent, but that the court completely departed from the majority rule.
This impression is based upon a reading of the opinion in the Signs case and
the court's reference to the Signs case in Damm v. Elyria Lodge, 158 Ohio St.
107, 117, 107 N.E.2d 337, 343 (1952). Bensing, Domestic Relations, Sur-
vey of Ohio Law - 1952, 4 W. REs. L. REV. 224, 226 n.16 (1953).
Ohio, on the basis of the Elyria Lodge case, has been listed as one of nineteen jur-
isdictions rejecting interspousal immunity. PROSSmR, TORTS § 56, at 885 (3d ed. 1964).
In a 1965 case, the Negligence Law Committee of the Michigan Bar Association was
requested to submit a brief amicus curiae. Two briefs were submitted, one advocating
and the other opposing the defense of interspousal tort immunity. The appendix to the
majority opinion contains an exhaustive survey of the jurisdictions. Due to the Elyria
Lodge case, Ohio is listed with those jurisdictions that have permitted interspousal suits
in general. Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 543, 138 N.W.2d 343, 356 (1965).
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arisen out of automobile accidents in which the injured family
member was a passenger, and it has been suggested by one authority
that many if not most of these were brought because the owner or
operator was insured. 2 The scarcity of British precedent in the par-
ent and child litigation may well be explained, with the exception
of one case,8" by the fact that automobile ownership had not been
as prevalent in Great Britain as it has been in the United States.
The Signs case was returned to the Ohio Supreme Court in
195484 after a trial on the merits. This time, the court ruled that,
based on the facts developed at the trial, the minor plaintiff could
not recover. Finding no negligence on the part of the partnership,
the court held that even though the father might not in his business
or vocational capacity be immune from personal tort liability to his
unemancipated minor child, a parent was not subject to more exten-
sive liability merely because it was his own child that was injured on
the premises rather than the child of someone else. This holding is
consistent with analogous cases in which the Ohio courts have main-
tained a strict attitude toward children injured on the premises of
others.8 5
(1) Subsequent Court Decisions.-In 1961, the Ohio Supreme
Court without opinion refused to review the dismissal of an ordi-
nary negligence case in which a minor child sought damages from
his father for serious injuries sustained when struck by an automo-
bile driven by the father, absent malice, and with no question of
business capacity, agency, or the like." This decision was in accord
with the weight of authority, for, despite many inroads into the gen-
eral parental immunity rule in the post-war era, no court as of 1961
had allowed a simple negligence suit by a child against its parent
when both parties were alive.
Wisconsin, in the 1963 case of Goller v. White," became the
first jurisdiction ostensibly to deny parental immunity from liability
for simple negligence. Although the suit was brought against a
foster parent for injuries sustained by the child while he was riding
on the drawbar of a tractor driven by the father, the Wisconsin
court apparently treated the case as though a natural parent had
8 2 McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VILL. L. REv. 521, 545 (1960).
83 Young v. Rankin, [1934) Sess. Cas. 499.
8 4 Signs v. Signs, 161 Ohio St. 241, 118 N.E.2d 411 (1954).85 Probert, Torts, Survey of Ohio Law - 1954, 6 W. RES. L. REV. 313, 316 n.15
(1955).
86 Wilke v. Wilke, 172 Ohio St. 198, 174 N.F.2d 101 (1961).
8720 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
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been sued. Finding that the father's insurance contract did not ex-
tend to this accident, the court nevertheless held the parent person-
ally liable. The family discord argument was rejected because of
the fact that Wisconsin had for thirty-five years recognized the right
of the wife to sue her husband and this had resulted in no adverse
effects on family harmony."8 The court "abolished" parental im-
munity in all cases except when the act involved a right of parental
authority over the child or the exercise of ordinary parental discre-
tion while providing food, clothing, housing, medical and dental
services, and other care.89 Thus Wisconsin has given the parent
only a qualified immunity which is limited to matters that are in-
herently associated with domestic matters or which affect necessary
parental disciplinary control. In 1966, Wisconsin logically held
that the effect of the Goller decision was to annul the child's immu-
nity as well as the parent's, with the end result that the parent could
likewise sue his unemancipated minor.9 This case and others that
recently have allowed similar actions stand for the proposition that
the abolition of parental immunity is not just a one-sided proposal
in favor of the minor child. 1 If the minor can sue the parent for a
personal tort, logically the parent should be able to sue the minor.
This is an important factor when one considers the numerous acci-
dents in which minors are involved and the fact that financial re-
sponsibility laws generally result in the minor driver being pro-
tected by insurance coverage.2
(2) Exceptions to the Immunity Doctrine.-Since the Signs
decision in 1952, the courts of such leading states as Pennsylvania,"
New Jersey, 4 New York, 5 and Rhode Island, " along with a num-
ber of other states," have refused to abrogate parental immunity.
However, so many exceptions have developed to the general immu-
nity rule that, as recently pointed out by two legal writers, it has
88 Id. at 410, 122 N.W.2d at 196.
89 Id. at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
90Ertl v. Ertl, 30 Wis. 2d 372, 141 N.W.2d 208 (1966) established that a parent
could sue the child driver of a negligently operated automobile which struck the parent.
91 Gaudreau v. Gaudreau, 215 A.2d 695 (N.H. 1965). Cf. Baits v. Bats, 142 N.W.
2d 66 (Minn. 1965), wherein the court warned that its decision should not be con-
strued as abrogating either interspousal or parental immunity.
9 2 Scanlon & Schultz, Responsibility of Parents Where Minors Are Operating Their
Car, 32 OrIO B. 1023 (1959); Note, 9 W. RF-S. L Riv. 490, 495 (1958).
9 3 Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957).
94 Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960).
95 Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.2d 718, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1961).
96 Castellucci v. Castellucci, 188 A.2d 467 (R.I. 1963).
97 Authorities are collected in Annot., 3 A.LR.2d Later Case Service 37 (1965).
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been eroded to the point in some jurisdictions at which it is now
merely a rule that the parent and child may sue each other in tort
unless the injury was caused by ordinary negligence.98 In a num-
ber of jurisdictions since 1952, the child has been allowed to sue
the parent in either the latter's business or vocational capacity or
both in accordance with the Signs decision. Similarly, the emanci-
pated child has been allowed to sue his parent' ° in his parental
capacity. Several states have allowed the child's action when they
have found the parent's conduct intentional,' or in automobile
cases when such conduct amounted to what the law deems willful
or wanton misconduct, generally involving intoxication.0 Several
states in this same period, although adhering to the general immu-
nity rule when the parties are living, have permitted the suit against
a deceased parent's estate.' 3 In a related area, suits between sib-
lings have recently been allowed with greater frequency. 0 4
D. Husband-Wife Litigation
In the years following the Elyria Lodge case, the courts of Ohio
do not appear to have been inundated with husband and wife litiga-
tion in tort any more than they were in the parent and child area.
In Lowman v. Lowman,105 a divorce action decided in 1956, the
plaintiff-wife filed an amended petition to nullify a previously exe-
cuted separation agreement. It was alleged that during the separa-
tion period while the divorce was pending the husband had struck
the plaintiff several times and had thrown her into an automobile
0 8 Akers & Drumond, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family, 19 J. MO. B.
166, 170 (1963).
99 Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151 Colo. 418, 378 P.2d 640 (1963); Borst v. Borst, 41
Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952); cf. Cody v. J. A. Dodds & Sons, 252 Iowa 1394,
110 N.W.2d 255 (1961). In the latter case, the negligent father was a member of a
partnership, but the partnership could be sued as a separate legal entity in Iowa.
100Martinez v. Southern Pac. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 244, 288 P.2d 868 (1955); accord,
Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 74 S.E.2d 170 (1953).
101 E.g., Gillet v. Gillet, 168 Cal. App. 2d 102, 335 P.2d 736 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
102 E.g., Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956); Decker v.
Decker, 20 Misc. 2d 438, 193 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Cowgill v. Boock,
189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950); Hoffman v. Tracy, 406 P.2d 323 (Wash. 1965).
Cases are collected in Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d Later Case Service 39 (1965).
10 3 Davis v. Smith, 126 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1954), aff'd, 253 F.2d 286 (3d
Cir. 1958); Harlan Nat'l Bank v. Gross, 346 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. 1961); Brennecke v.
Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Dean v. Smith, 211 A.2d 410 (N.H. 1965).
104 E.g., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Overlock v. Ruede-
man, 147 Conn. 649, 165 A.2d 335 (1960); Detwiler v. Detwiler, 162 Pa. Super. 383,
57 A.2d 426 (1948); Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 113 S.E.2d 875 (1960). See
Note, Right of Brother and Sister To Sue, 3 WILLIAM & MARY L. REv. 194 (1961).
105 166 Ohio St. 1, 139 N.E.2d 1 (1956).
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with such force that she sustained serious injuries.' The court re-
fused to set aside the separation agreement on the sole basis of this
claim, choosing instead other grounds to invalidate the agreement."°7
Chief Justice Taft said: "Plaintiff would have a cause of action
against defendant for any injuries which may have been inflicted
upon plaintiff's person by the willful or negligent acts of defen-
dant."' 8 He concluded that any such cause of action would not be
affected by the separation agreement."0 9 This holding certainly ap-
pears to have been based on the proposition that interspousal im-
munity - or at least the husband's immunity in tort - was not
recognized in Ohio.
One of the arguments that is sometimes presented to disallow
interspousal personal tort actions is the lack of necessity of such
suits because other remedies such as divorce or criminal actions are
available to the injured party."0  But in the Lowman case, essen-
tially a divorce proceeding, Chief Justice Taft stated that the wife's
remedy for any existing personal injuries would be in a personal in-
jury suit,"' a procedure which would not be consistent with lower
court authority prior to the Elyria Lodge case.12 In 1939, the court
of appeals held, subsequent to recognition of interspousal immunity
by the lower Ohio courts, that a defendant-husband could not be
sued after divorce for an injury sustained by the wife in an automo-
bile accident occurring the day before they were married."8 The
court stated that the effect of the marriage was to extinguish any
cause of action that might otherwise have existed in the wife and
that once it was extinguished, the divorce action would not revive
it 114
In a 1963 court of appeals case, LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel.
Co.,"' it was noted that the husband's immunity in personal tort
1'6Id. at 5, 139 N.E.2d at 4.
107 Id. at 8-10, 139 N.E.2d at 6-7.
10 8 Id. at 9-10, 139 N.E.2d at 6-7, citing Damm v. Elyria Lodge, 158 Ohio St. 107,
107 N.E.2d 337 (1952).
109 166 Ohio St. at 10, 139 N.E.2d at 7.
11" McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 1030,
1052 (1930); Comment, Interspousal Immaunity - California Follows the Trend, 36
So. CAL. L. REv. 456, 466 (1963).
'M 166 Ohio St. at 9-10, 139 N.E.2d at 6-7.
112 E.g., Tanno v. Eby, 78 Ohio App. 21, 68 NE.2d 813 (1946); Wirrig v. Hatter,
29 Ohio L. Abs. 587 (Ct App. 1939); Leonardi v. Leonardi, 21 Ohio App. 110, 153
N.E. 93 (1925); Finn v. Finn, 19 Ohio App. 302 (1924).
11" Wirrig v. Hatter, supra note 112.
114 Id. at 589.
115 120 Ohio App. 129, 201 NE.2d 533 (1963).
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actions had been abolished by the Elyria Lodge case. The plaintiff
had brought an action against the telephone company, alleging that
while she and her husband were separated pending a divorce, the
husband had the telephone company connect her private telephone
line with an extension in his residence which was located in another
part of the community. The inference was that the husband was
thereby enabled to intercept the wife's private phone conversations.
It was necessary to determine whether the plaintiff-wife had a cause
of action against her husband for invasion of privacy before liability
could be imposed upon the defendant-telephone company for know-
ingly aiding in that tort. Judge Duffey observed that the opinion in
the Elyria Lodge case upheld a husband's personal liability to the
wife for both intentional and negligent torts,"' and Judge Taft's
opinion in Lowman. 7 was cited as additional support for the hus-
band's liability for-"willful or negligent acts.""'  Judge Duffey ad-
mitted that privacy cases might present special problems when the
parties were living together as man and wife; in the instant case,
however, not only were the parties separated, but the wife also in-
tended to obtain a divorce."' Judge Duffey concluded that the
wife had presented a prima facie case against the husband for inva-
sion of her privacy,"' It was further held that the telephone com-
pany could be held severally liable for aiding in the commission of
this tort, and the trial court ruling which had granted the defendant-
company's motion for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's
case was accordingly reversed.''
That the LeCrone case must logically rest on the proposition
that interspousal immunity no longer existed in Ohio may be seen
by comparing it with a recent federal district court decision in
Iowa,12 2 a state that recognizes interspousal immunity. The plain-
tiff brought an action against his former wife and two other women
for damages based on an alleged conspiracy to injure plaintiff's per-
son, reputation, and property. It appeared that the women made
statements to a Catholic priest in support of the wife's plan to obtain
permission from the church authorities for separate maintenance
116 Id. at 135, 201 N.E.2d at 539.
117 Lowman v. Lowman, 166 Ohio St. 1, 139 N..2d 1 (1956).
118 120 Ohio App. at 136, 201 N.E.2d at 539.
"19 Id. at 136-37, 201 N.E.2d at 539.
120 Id. at 137, 201 N.F_.2d at 540.
121 Id. at 138-39, 201 N.E.2d at 540-41.




and to receive ecclesiastical approval to initiate divorce proceedings.
The court held not only that the statements were absolutely privi-
leged as far as all three women were concerned but also that, in any
event, the wife could not be joined in a conspiracy action unless the
plaintiff could sue her individually." 3 Under Iowa law, the court
noted that one spouse could not sue the other for tort, including
slander;.2 . therefore, she could not be joined with the other two de-
fendants. But in the LeCrone25 case, in which the right of privacy
was involved, the court in effect held that the defendant-telephone
company was a joint tortfeasor with several liability as an aider of
the husband in his intentional invasion of the wife's privacy. Under
the new Ohio provisions on joinder of parties'26 and causes of ac-
tions, 2  enacted after the LeCrone case and in light of Judge Duf-
fey's position regarding the husband's lack of immunity, 2 ' there
would appear to be no procedural or substantive reason at present
why the husband and the telephone company could not be joined in
such an action.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
There are other significant developments in Ohio law, subse-
quent to the Signs and Elyria Lodge cases, which have had a bearing
on family immunities. In 1955, the general assembly passed legis-
lation which provided that an unincorporated association could be
sued as a separate legal entity'29 and that its assets were to be sub-
ject to any judgment obtained in such an action.80 In addition, the
law specifically provided that such a judgment was not enforceable
against the property of a member of such an association.' 3 ' In
1961, the Supreme Court of Ohio interpreted the effect of this
123 Ibid.
124 Id. at 41.
12 5 LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 120 Ohio App. 129, 201 N.E.2d 533 (1963).
126 Omo REV. CODE 5 2307.191.
127 131 Ohio Laws 1677 (1965). The general assembly repealed OHIO RnV. CODE
§ 2309.06 which related to causes of actions united in the same petition affecting all
parties. This former statute, as interpreted by Huggins v. Morrell & Co., 176 Ohio St.
171, 198 N.E.2d 448 (1964), had been held to have a restraining effect on OHIO REV.
CODE § 2307.191, the permissive joinder of parties statute enacted in 1963.
-18 LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 120 Ohio App. 129, 137, 201 N.E.2d 533, 540
(1963).
129 OIo REv. CODE § 1745.01.
130 OHIo REv. CODE § 1745.02.
131 Ibid.
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statute in a case involving a veterans' organization.' Judge Zim-
merman, speaking for the majority, pointed out that these statutory
provisions were merely cumulative and that a plaintiff could follow
the previous procedure and sue the individual members of the as-
sociation "collectively and conjointly."'33  (It will be recalled that
in the Elyria Lodge case the officers were sued in their representative
capacity.) In addition, the judge stated that under the new statutes
a party could sue the unincorporated association as an entity and in
the name by which it was commonly known.'3 4 He emphasized an
important point that was not commented on in the earlier intra-
family immunity suits: When a suit is brought against an unincor-
porated association organized and functioning in the business world,
the principles of partnership law apply, and the individual members
would incur personal liability for any adverse judgment rendered
against the association.'35 However, if the suit were against an
unincorporated fraternal or social group, agency principles would
obtain, and only those members who actively participated in the
event which resulted in the tortious act would be personally liable. 36
In the Elyria Lodge case, the plaintiff's husband was not an
officer of the Elks Lodge nor an active participant in the acts which
resulted in injuries to the wife. Therefore, he would not have been
subject to a personal judgment even if he had been joined as a de-
fendant. Thus the husband as an Elk member was only in a tech-
nical sense involved in his wife's litigation. Conversely, in the
Signs case, the unincorporated association was a business partnership
composed of the minor plaintiff's father and another business asso-
ciate. As a result, if there had been an adverse judgment against
the two partners and either the firm's assets or any liability coverage
possessed by the association had not been sufficient to satisfy the
judgment, the individual assets of the partners, including the fa-
ther's, could have been attached. This emphasizes the fact that
Signs was in reality a more radical step in the direction of removing
intra-family immunity than was the Elyria Lodge case.
In other jurisdictions prior to 1965, greater inroads on intra-
family immunity have occurred in the interspousal area rather than
132 Lyons v. American Legion Post No. 650 Realty Co., 172 Ohio St. 331, 175 N.E.-
2d 733 (1961).
13 Id. at 333, 175 NXE.2d at 735.
13 4 Id. at 334, 175 N.E.2d at 736.
'35 Ibid.
136 Id. at 336, 175 N.E.2d at 736.
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in parent and child suits.' Formerly, the general rule other than
in Wisconsin was that an unemancipated child could not maintain
an action in damages against his parent for personal injuries result-
ing from the parent's ordinary negligence."8 However, thirteen
jurisdictions by judicial decision have recognized interspousal suits
on a negligence theory or have indicated that this type of action
would be allowed.139 Three additional states have authorized by
statute interspousal tort actions, including those sounding in negli-
gence.14 It must be admitted that these sixteen jurisdictions are
in the minority because a majority of states by decision 41 and five
others by statute' still bar interspousal litigation for personal tort
based on negligence.
Nevertheless, the majority jurisdictions have developed excep-
tions to the general interspousal immunity rule similar to those in
the parent and child field and more frequendy have allowed suit
against a deceased spouse's estate on the grounds that death has
intervened "to forever circumvent all possibility of marital dis-
cord." 43 Others will allow suit against the spouse's employer where
the wife has been injured by the husband in the course of his em-
ployment, generally while operating the employer's automobile.
144
Still other decisions recognize the action when the tort occurred
1
37 Bloustein, Torts, 1963 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 376-77 (1964).
138 Annot., 3 A.LR.2d Later Case Service 36 (1965).
139 Bennett v. Bennett, 224 Ala. 335, 140 So. 378 (1932); Cramer v. Cramer, 379
P.2d 95 (Alaska 1963); Leach v. Leach, 227 Ark. 599, 300 S.W.2d 15 (1957); Klein
v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962); Rains v. Rains, 97
Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935); Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 Ad. 889 (1914);
Lorang v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949); Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d
480 (Ky. 1953); Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963); Court-
ney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938); Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S.C. 129,
166 S.E. 101 (1932); Scorvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941); Haums-
child v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
140 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-5 (Supp. 1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07-05; N.Y.
GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW, under which interspousal tort suits are recognized but only
if the defendant is uninsured. N.Y. INS. LAW § 167(3).
141The majority rule has been set forth in PROSSER, TORTS § 116, at 882 (3d ed.
1964).
'
42 HAWAII REV. LAWS § 325-5 (1955); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (Smith-Hurd
1959); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:291 (1965); MASS. LAWS ANN. ch. 209, § 6 (Supp.
1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 111 (1965).
143 E.g., Pelowski v. Frederickson, 263 Minn. 371, 116 N.W.2d 701 (1963); Long
v. Landy, 35 N.J. 44, 171 A.2d 1 (1961); Johnson v. Peoples First Natel Bank & Trust
Co., 394 Pa. 116, 145 A.2d 716 (1958). See Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 662 (1953).
14 4 Kowaleski v. Kowaleski, 227 Ore. 45, 361 P.2d 64 (1961). Cases are collected
in Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 677 (1965). There is one Ohio case, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Huff, 48 Ohio App. 412, 194 NYB. 429 (1933), rev'd on other grounds, 128 Ohio St.
469, 191 NBE. 761 (1934), on this point from the pre-Elyria Lodge days.
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prior to marriage, even though the suit is continued during cover-
tare.'45 Of course, some jurisdictions will permit the action when
the husband is guilty of an intentional tort committed against the
wife.'46 Even a common law state such as Maine, which forbids
interspousal personal tort actions, will, in cases involving a two-car
collision, allow a defendant-motorist, when sued by a plaintiff-wife,
to implead the plaintiff's husband for contribution where it might
be found that the husband was partly responsible for the accident.' 7
It must also be noted that although some states will not allow the
interspousal suit, under existing direct action statutes, a party may
sue the spouse's insurance carrier directly. 4 ' Some jurisdictions will
permit the wife to sue the husband but illogically deny the husband
a similar right.4 In a 1965 Michigan decision involving the re-
evaluation of the issue of interspousal immunity, the court noted
that presently thirty-two jurisdictions entertain interspousal personal
tort actions in one form or another.' Thus, when it is considered
that a substantial minority of states allow interspousal suits outright
and that others allow them under numerous exceptional circum-
stances, the modern post-war assault against all the immunities ap-
pears to have met with greater success in interspousal suits than in
parent and child litigation.
It was with this background that the Ohio Supreme Court was
again confronted with the intra-family immunity issue in 1965 and
1966. The membership of the court had changed substantially
since 1952, as only two members, Chief Justice Taft and Judge Zim-
merman, remained of the court that had rendered the Signs and the
Elyria Lodge decisions. The first of these recent cases involved the
issue of interspousal immunity. In Lyons v. Lyons, 5' the plaintiff
alleged that he suffered bodily injuries when struck by an automo-
bile driven by his wife. It was further alleged that since the acci-
dent the parties had moved to Arizona and were residents of that
state at the time of suit. The defendant-wife by answer raised the
14 5 O'Grady v. Potts, 193 Kan. 644, 396 P.2d 285 (1964); Brown v. Gosser, 262
S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953).
146 Cf. Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962); Goode
v. Martinis, 58 Wash. 2d 229, 361 P.2d 941 (1961) (divorce was pending between
the parties).
14 7 Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963).
148 Sorienz v. Great Am. Cas. Co., 168 So. 2d 418 (La. Ct. App. 1964).
149 E.g., Scholtens v. Scholtens, 230 N.C. 149, 52 S.E.2d 350 (1949); Fehr v. Gen-
eral Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 246 Wis. 228, 16 N.W.2d 787 (1944).
150 Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 543, 138 N.W.2d 343, 355 (1965).
1512 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965).
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defense of interspousal immunity in that the parties were living to-
gether as husband and wife at the date of the accident. Judgment
on the pleadings was entered for the defendant but was reversed by
the court of appeals on the authority of the Elyria Lodge case. The
cause then came before the supreme court on a motion to certify.
Judge O'Neill, speaking for a unanimous court, stated: "The
question presented is whether one spouse may maintain an action
for personal injuries resulting from the negligence of the other
spouse, where the parties were married and living together' as hus-
band and wife at the time of the alleged injury."' 52
It was held that such a spouse could not maintain such an action
for three reasons: (1) the public policy of Ohio is to promote domes-
tic tranquility and to encourage family harmony, which policy might
be adversely affected by allowing interspousal personal tort ac-
tions; " ' (2) the allowance of such an action would create a climate
for fraudulent and collusive suits resulting in unconscionable raids
on insurance companies;... and (3) the removal of interspousal im-
munity would constitute such a departure from well-established
policy that any such change should come by legislative as opposed
to judicial action. 15
Judge O'Neill distinguished the fact pattern from that of the
Elyria Lodge case, wherein there was no danger of marital dishar-
mony because the Elk member-husband was dead and the lodge was
an impersonal organization. There was no danger of fraud and col-
lusion because the husband was not a party defendant and thus had
no opportunity to control the litigation. The judge stressed that the
Elyria Lodge case was not a true interspousal suit but rather was an
action against an unincorporated association at a time when such
an organization could not be sued as a separate legal entity. " He
admitted that both the Signs case and the Elyria Lodge case con-
tained language that would permit recovery in the present action,
but such language had not been written into the syllabus of either
case and he did n6t feel bound to follow it.'
Perhaps one of the more significant statements made in the
Lyons opinion, as far as future intra-family suits are concerned, is
the statement by Judge O'Neill pointing out the differences between
1
52 1d. at 244, 208 N.E.2d at 535.
'53 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155Id. at 246-47, 208 N.E.2d at 536-37.
1561d. at 245-46, 208 N.E.2d at 536.
1571d. at 246, 208 N.E.2d at536.
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the two earlier actions - both of which were against unincorpo-
rated associations - and a true intra-family suit. 5  Regarding the
latter situation, he said: "The duty of support replaces the duty of
compensation for injuries sustained by one because of the negligence
of the other."' 59
This appears to be an echo of similar language used by Judge
O'Neill in 1964, when, in an opinion 6 ° denying two children a
recovery against a third person in an action based on alienation of
their father's affection, he stated: "A child may indeed expect that
his parent will have affection for him. This may be a moral obli-
gation, but no legal obligation exists. The sole legal obligation im-
posed upon the parent is that of support."''
These two statements, even standing by themselves, may well
forecast similar holdings in future actions involving parental as well
as interspousal actions. But this is not all. The decisions restating
and retaining municipal tort immunity,'6 2 the confusing distinctions
created by the court in the charitable immunity area,'63 the long
delay in recognizing the implied warranty theory6 4 in products lia-
bility litigation, and the Lyons. 5 decision all reflect a more con-
servative attitude on the part of the present Ohio Supreme Court
than was evidenced in the Signs and Elyria Lodge cases.
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INTRA-FAMILY IMMUNITY
The venturesome spirit, albeit of a limited nature, displayed on
occasion by the court in the late 1940's and early 1950's appears
to have been supplanted in the 1960's by one of a more defensive
tenor.
Judge O'Neill did more in Lyons than distinguish the Elyria
Lodge and Signs cases. He reconstructed and put back in place the
158 Id. at 245, 208 N.E.2d at 536.
159 Id. at 246, 208 N.E.2d at 536.
160 Kane v. Quigley, 1 Ohio St. 2d 1, 203 N.E.2d 338 (1964).
161 Id. at 3, 203 N.E.2d at 339.
162 Maloney v. City of Columbus, 2 Ohio St. 2d 213, 208 N.E.2d 141 (1965);
Hyde v. City of Lakewood, 2 Ohio St. 2d 155, 207 N.E.2d 547 (1965); Hack v. City
of Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 189 N.E.2d 857 (1963).
16 3 In Gibbon v. YWCA, 170 Ohio St. 280, 164 N.E.2d 563 (1960), the court
held that Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956) was
not to be interpreted as extending liability to other charitable institutions. In Blanken-
ship v. Alter, 171 Ohio St. 65, 167 N.E.2d 922 (1960), the court affirmed a judgment
against a Catholic bishop for injuries sustained by a patron at a church bingo party.
Note, Immunity of Non-Hospital Charities Re-examined, 21 OHIo ST. L.J. 247 (1960).
164 Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
165 Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965).
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two "pillars" of family immunity that Judge Stewart had previ-
ously demolished in the earlier parent and child suit, Signs v.
Signs. 6 In addition to the domestic tranquility and fraud and
collusion arguments, he added a third "pillar," namely, the avoid-
ance of judicial legislation.
The domestic tranquility argument loses its persuasiveness when
it is recalled that intra-family contract actions and tort actions in-
volving property are allowed. It is difficult to support the position
that more family bitterness will result from a law suit over a negli-
gently inflicted traffic accident similar to the one in the Lyons case
than from a suit regarding a misappropriated insurance policy, the
profits of a business, or the contesting of a will.'67 Inasmuch as
most of the modern intra-family suits involve an insured motorist as
a defendant, the typical case is in reality a direct action against the
other member's insurance company. In a case where liability is
clear, payment of the claim to the other family member should in
fact promote family harmony by protecting the family from eco-
nomic loss.
The second "pillar" supporting family immunity rebuilt by
Judge O'Neill is the argument that there is a danger of fraud and
collusion between the spouses which could result in unconscionable
raids on insurance companies.'" ' This "pillar" contradicts the pre-
vious one. Under the domestic tranquility argument, the fear is put
forth that intra-family tort actions will encourage broken homes and
family discord, but here the claim is made that allowing such ac-
tions - when insurance is involved - will create an illicit spirit
of complete togetherness among the family members.
Three jurisdictions in this country have cited Judge Stewart's an-
swer to this argument, so well presented in the Signs case in 1952.169
Since Lyons7 . was a unanimous decision, apparently none of the
judges on the 1965 court agreed with Judge Stewart's approach to
the fraud issue in the Signs case. It is unfortunate that neither
Chief Justice Taft nor Judge Zimmerman explained his apparent
change in attitude concerning the fraud and collusion argument.
Fraud and collusion may be practiced by the insured and the
insurance adjuster, by a doctor and his patient, or by intimate friends,
'
6 6 Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952).
16 7 Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546, 554, 180 A.2d 772, 776 (1962) (dissent).
168 2 Ohio St. 2d at 245, 208 N.E.2d at 535.
160 Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Baits v. Baits, 142 N.W.-
2d 66 (Minn. 1966); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
170 Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965).
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business partners or even an individual without the assistance of
anyone. Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court,
one of the foremost jurists in the country, espoused Judge Stewart's
viewpoint on this problem in a case in which the court held that an
unemancipated minor could sue his minor brother or sister or par-
ent for an intentional tort.171  Justice Traynor wrote: "Courts will
not immunize tortfeasors from liability... because of the possibility
of fraud, but will depend upon the legislature to deal with the
problem as a question of public policy."' 72
In another case in 1960 involving an action between minor
brothers,173 Justice I'Anson of the Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals stated:
Courts should not immunize tort-feasors because of the possi-
bility of fraud or collusion. It is more important to protect an
infant in his person than to avoid the possibility of fraud and col-
lusion by the denial of such protection. If actions were barred
because of the possibility of fraud many wrongs would be per-
mitted to go without redress.174
Some of the wrongs that the Virginia court might have mentioned
are: tortious prenatal injuries, negligent infliction of mental disturb-
ance, and intra-family actions based on negligent injuries.
The third "pillar" of family immunity, namely, if there is to be
substantial change in the public policy of the state, it should ema-
nate from the legislature, had previously been relied upon by lower
courts in Ohio 75 in the pre-Elyria Lodge days. Professor Leon
Green, the noted tort authority, responded to this argument rather
convincingly a number of years ago in the process of commenting
on the reluctance of courts to act in a related area of the law, namely,
the extension to a wife of the right to sue for loss of consortium.'
Tort law, according to Professor Green, has been and will continue
to be developed by courts on a case by case basis.'77  ie noted that
legislation in the tort field very often created more problems for the
courts than it solved, citing as examples guest statutes, traffic codes,
17'Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955), citing from Borst v.
Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 654, 251 P.2d 149, 155 (1952).
17245 Cal. 2d at 431-32, 289 P.2d at 225.
173 Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 113 S.E.2d 875 (1960).
174 Id. at 883, 113 S.E.2d at 878. (Emphasis added.)
175 Tanno v. Eby, 78 Ohio App. 21, 68 N.E.2d 813 (1946); Leonardi v. Leonardi,
21 Ohio App. 110, 153 N.E. 93 (1925); Finn v. Finn, 19 Ohio App. 302 (1924).
176 Green, Protection of the Family, 10 HAsTiNGs LJ. 237 (1959).
177 Id. at 245.
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heart balm acts, and dram shop legislation." 8  In Green's opinion,
the average state legislature is generally confronted with too many
other governmental problems and functions to be able to devote
much time to tort legislation.17
In the Mosier case, 8 ' previously referred to, Justice Smith of the
Michigan Supreme Court, in a concurring opinion, said:
Albeit, I am in sympathy with the basic tone of the opinion of
Justice KELLY who thinks that this new branch of tort liability
could be better delineated by the legislature. I differ, however, in
his conclusion that because there are so many ramifications we
would be better off doing nothing in the cases before us and leav-
ing the whole question to the legislature Of course, the legislature
may or may not act. Courts do not have the same options; they
must render judgments between the parties. Cases may not be as-
signed to committees. Therefore, when, as here, parties call upon
us for decision, the matter being within our jurisdictional compe-
tence, we must decide.' 8 '
The Ohio Supreme Court in 1956 did not find this judicial legis-
lation argument insurmountable, for it took it upon itself to over-
turn charitable hospital immunity." 2 In 1966, the last of the four
family immunity cases to be discussed in this article reached the
Ohio Supreme Court. In Teramano v. Teramano,"'8 the plaintiff,
an unemancipated eleven-year-old boy, alleged that he was severely
injured when his defendant-father drove his car without warning at
a high rate of speed into the driveway of the family residence, strik-
ing the boy and causing severe bodily injuries. The language of the
complaint claimed "the whole, sole and proximate cause of the acci-
dent and the resulting injuries were due to the negligence and will-
ful misconduct of the defendant while ... under the influence of
intoxicating beverages.' 84
The Teramano plaintiff in his petition was apparently trying to
bring his facts within either the business or vocational exception of
Signs, or the willful and wanton exception8 5 recognized in other
1T8Id. at 246-48.
' 9 Id. at 245-48.
18°Mosier v. Carney, 138 N.W.2d 343 (Mich. 1965).
'
81 Id. at 359.
18 2 Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1965).
1 83 Teramano v. Teramano, 6 Ohio St. 2d 117, 246 N.E.2d 375 (1966), reversing
1 Ohio App. 2d 504, 205 N.E.2d 586 (1965).
184 6 Ohio St. 2d at 120-21, 216 NXE.2d at 378.
185 It was alleged in the complaint that the father was physically handicapped and
that his car was specially modified to make it possible for him to drive, that he was en-
gaged in his employment at the time of the mishap, and further that he
knew or could have known that operating his automobile at such a rate of
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jurisdictions. However, although the petition alleged that such con-
duct was "willful and negligent," it did not specifically use the term
"wanton," or allege a conscious intention to injure. The plaintiff
attempted to correct this omission in his opening statement in the
trial court. After referring to the facts alleged in the petition, coun-
sel stated that the evidence would show the requisite conscious in-
tent, i.e., that the father was aware that children often exited into
the driveway and had agreed with his wife and others to drive care-
fully past this exit so as not to endanger emerging children. 8 ' At
the conclusion of the opening statement, the trial court granted
judgment for the defendant on the theory that an unemancipated
child may not sue his parent for negligence.' The court of appeals
reversed, holding that where willful and wanton misconduct is
pleaded, a recovery could be had in Ohio by a child against his
parent. 88
When the case reached the Ohio Supreme Court, two basic is-
sues were presented: (1) whether these facts raised an issue of will-
ful and wanton misconduct; and (2) whether recovery should be
allowed if such facts did raise that issue' 89
The court held that, based on the alleged facts in the petition and
in the opening statement, the plaintiff could not recover and re-
versed the appellate court decision. 9 ° Judge Brown, writing the
majority opinion, stated that the plaintiff did not make out a case of
willful or malicious tort."'' He thus avoided a discussion of that
extremely nebulous concept, willful and wanton misconduct, which
has most frequently arisen in Ohio in cases concerning application
of the guest statute. Judge Brown concluded that in the parent and
child cases in which recovery has been allowed, the basis has been
either what he termed "an abandonment of the parental relation-
ship," or that the cases have involved a dual relationship between
speed - particularly while under the influence of alcohol - . . . failure to
keep said automobile under control, and failure to warn of his approach, could
be dangerous to persons at said place, and particularly dangerous to this Plain-
tiff, who, as Defendant knew, constantly used said rear porch exit. Third
amended petition filed in Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Tera-
mano v. Teramano 736, 196 (June 12, 1962).
186 6 Ohio St. 2d at 118, 216 N.E.2d at 376.
187 Ibid.
1881 Ohio App. 2d 504, 205 N.E.2d 586 (1965).
189 6 Ohio St. 2d at 117, 216 N.E.2d at 375.
190 Id. at 120, 216 N.E.2d at 377.
191 Id. at 118, 216 N.E.2d at 376. (Emphasis added.)
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the parent and child, such as master and servant or carrier and pas-
senger.1"' In the latter cases, the family relationship is merely inci-
dental and "becomes so logically irrelevant as to prevent immunity
from attaching."'9 3  The judge stated that Signs fitted into this
latter category, concluding that numerous authorities have allowed
a child's action against the parent only in two instances: (1) where
the act is done by the parent in his business or vocational capacity
(similar to Signs); or (2) where the parent's conduct shows a mali-
cious intent to injure.'94 This intention is dear when rape or mur-
der are involved or when punishment is inflicted with malice be-
cause, as the opinion stated, "a person is presumed to intend the
ordinary consequences of his voluntary act."' 95
This latter point was supported by the Oregon case of Cowgill v.
Boock, 98 a wrongful death action against the estate of a father who,
while grossly intoxicated, had required his minor son against his
will to accompany him on a wild automobile ride which ended in
both their deaths. The Oregon court held that the decedent father
was guilty of willful misconduct, stating:
Of course, the father did not actually intend to kill his son, but
he was nevertheless responsible for the consequences which flowed
from his wrongful act ... The father knew or ought to have
known of the danger in driving at a high speed at nighttime over
this mountainous highway when he and his brother were both
drunk.197
Although driving while intoxicated will not usually of itself be
sufficient to constitute willful and wanton misconduct in Ohio,'
intoxication and the various aggravating circumstances present in
the Cowgill case would probably qualify under Ohio law as a case
of willful and wanton misconduct. 99  Therefore, the case of pre-
sumed intent that Judge Brown referred to in the Teramano opinion
is in reality the same as the concept of willful and wanton miscon-
duct. Judge Brown concluded that the plaintiff's proffered evidence
demonstrated neither a malicious intent nor an abandonment of the




106 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).
197 1d. at 290, 218 P.2d at 448.
198White v. Harvey, 170 Ohio St. 262, 264, 163 N.E.2d 898, 900 (1960).
199 Ibid.
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parental relationship." 0 Based on this reasoning, the trial court's
dismissal of the action was upheld.
Judge Herbert dissented, in the belief that the issue of whether
there was willful or wanton misconduct or an abandonment of the
parental relationship should have been left to the jury.20' He noted
at the outset that there may even be serious doubt whether parental
personal tort immunity should extend beyond the privilege of pa-
rental disciplinary control, but he limited his dissent to the question
of the right of trial by jury on the facts in this case.202
Although in Teramano the plaintiff lost because the facts
pleaded and presented in the opening statement would be "no evi-
dence" of "malicious intent or abandonment of the parental rela-
tionship,"2 and under a strict application of the rule of stare decisis
the case would be no authority beyond this bare holding, neverthe-
less, the syllabus, which is "the law of Ohio,"2 4 reads as follows:
"A malicious intent to injure existing in the conduct of a parent
toward his minor unemancipated child evidences abandonment of
the parental relationship. Malicious intent to injure in such cases
may be actual or implied."20 5
Thus, in addition to the business and vocational exception recog-
nized by the Signs case in 1952, the court in Teramano, at least
according to the syllabus, added another exception to the parentalimmunity rule: An unemancipated minor child may now sue his
parent for a personal tort when there is present a malicious intent
to injure the child. Of necessity, this new exception must be sub-
ject to a reasonable right of disciplinary control. It has become
even more important that the parent be entitled to this qualified
control as various jurisdictions - including Ohio by statute - grad-
ually withdraw the common law protection afforded parents from
personal tort liability to injured third parties for the torts committed
by minor children.20 6 On the other hand, the right of discipline
should be more severely limited than it has been in the past so that
200 6 Ohio St. 2d at 120, 216 N.E.2d at 377.
201 Id. at 120, 216 N.E.2d at 378.
202 Id. at 121, 216 N.E.2d at 378.
2 03 Id. at 120, 216 N.E.2d at 377.
204 Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 246, 208 N.E.2d 533, 536 (1965).
205 6 Ohio St. 2d at 117, 216 N.E.2d at 375 (syllabus).
206 See, e.g., OHIO REv. CoDa § 3109.09, imposing liability in an amount not exceed-
ing $250 on parents for acts of willful destruction committed by their children. In cer-
tain instances OHIO REV. CODE § 2151.411 imposes liability on parents of an adjudi-




the courts may more readily deal with the numerous child-beating
and abuse cases that have arisen in recent years.
207
V. FUTURE TORT LITIGATION IN OHIO
Although at first blush problems involving conflicts of law may
seem far removed from intra-family immunities, on closer analysis
it seems dear that conflicting principles may well play an important
part in the future of Ohio law in this field. Most tort litigation
today is concerned with automobile accidents in which more than
one vehicle is involved." 8 The same has been true of most of the
recent cases relating to the intra-family immunity." 9
The tremendous improvement in interstate highways through-
out the nation has and will continue to bring an increasing number
of non-residents into Ohio and will encourage Ohio citizens to
travel outside the state. Unfortunately, an inevitable result will be
an increase in Ohio automobile accident cases in which either the
parties are residents of different states or the litigation involves a
tort occurring in another state which very possibly has different
intra-family immunity laws. No immunity case has yet reached the
supreme court involving the typical automobile accident case in
which one family member was injured due to the negligence of an-
other member of the family.
The existence 'of the Ohio guest statute" may have prevented
such cases from reaching the supreme court. Signs and Elyria
Lodge involved injuries on premises; Lyons and Teramano involved
parties who were injured by automobiles, but in neither of these two
cases was the particular plaintiff in or on the vehicle, which would
have raised an issue under the guest statute. A review of the cases
in neighboring states shows that a number of them treat various
aspects of the immunity problem in a different manner than does
Ohio."' When it is recalled that over thirty-two jurisdictions recog-
2 0 McCoid, The Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon Family: Part One, 50
MINN. L REV. 1 (1965).
2 0 8 Morrissettv. Morrissett, 80 Nev. 566, 570, 397 P.2d 184, 187 (1964) (dissent).
209 Sterling v. Ritchie, 182 So. 2d 375 (La. Ct. App. 1966); Downs v. Pouling,
216 A.2d 29 (Me. 1966); Morrissett v. Morrissett, supra note 208; Johnson v. Johnson,
216 A.2d 781 (N.H. 1966); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965);
Murphy v. Barron, 45 Misc. 2d 905, 258 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Ct. App. 1965).
210 OHro REV. CODE § 4515.02.
2 11 Harlan Nat'l Bank v. Gross, 346 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961) (parental
immunity); Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953) (interspousal im-
munity); Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 138 N.W.2d 343 (1965) (allowing ad-
ministrator of deceased infant's estate to sue infant's father). Under N.Y. GEN. OBLI-
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nize some form of interspousal action212 and that others have greatly
limited the parental immunity rule,21 it is not unlikely that a ques-
tion of conflicts of law in this area may well be raised in Ohio
courts between members of an Ohio family involved in an out-of-
state accident or non-residents involved in an Ohio accident.
Traditionally, when problems of this nature have arisen, most
courts have followed the old territorial tort theory.214 According to
this theory, as applied to intra-family immunity questions, the
capacity of one family member to sue another is determined by the
law of the state in which the tort occurs. A contrary approach
taken by some writers,215 as well as by a growing number of
courts,21 6 treats the immunity question as one of family law rather
than substantive tort law and seeks to apply the law of the litigant's
domicile. As a matter of fact, in the Lyons case7 it was argued
that the husband and wife had moved to Arizona after the accident,
were presently domiciled in that state, and that therefore Arizona
law should apply.21 ' The opinion, espousing the territorial tort idea,
stated that the law of the place of the injury was applicable to the
immunity question."' Since Ohio was the place of injury as well as
the actual forum, Ohio law was applicable.2 However, it was
pointed out that the law of Arizona was not pleaded and so must
be presumed to be the same as Ohio's.2 21  Thus, a true conflicts
problem was not presented. Similiarly, the issue was not actually
GATIONS LAW § 3-313, interspousal tort suits-are recognized but not if the defendant
is insured. N.Y. INS. LAW § 167 (3); Kleinfelter, Interspousal Immunity in Pennsyl-
vania - a Concept in Evolution, 69 DICK. L. REv. 143 (1962). In applying Pennsyl-
vania law, a federal district court held that a minor son and a widow of the deceased
might sue the administrator for injuries sustained by the son in an automobile accident.
Davis v. Smith, 126 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1954), aft'd, 253 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1958).
212 Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 534, 138 N.W.2d 343, 344 (1965) set
forth this fact.
213 Cases cited notes 63-66 supra.
214 Akers & Drumond, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family, 19 J. Mo. B.
166, 170 (1963).
215 Law review articles are collected in Balts v. Balts, 142 N.W.2d 66, 68 n.4 (Minn.
1966); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 390: (Tent Draft No. 9,
1964).
216 Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Balts v. Balts, 142
N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1966); Johnson v. Johnson, 216 A.2d 781 (N.H. 1966). For a fur-
ther collection of cases, see Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 973, 987 (1964).
217 Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965).
2181d. at 243-44, 208 N.E.2d at 534-35.





litigated in the Signs, Elyria Lodge, and Teramano cases, all of which
involved family members domiciled in Ohio.
It is apparent that the last word on intra-family immunities in
Ohio has not been written. These four intra-family immunity cases
leave many questions unanswered. In the Lyons case,.2 the sylla-
bus, which Judge O'Neill stresses to be the controlling law in Ohio,
states: "A spouse may not maintain an action against the other
spouse for personal injuries resulting from the negligence of the
other spouse where the married persons are living together as hus-
band and wife at the time of the injury. 223
This syllabus does not directly prohibit or allow an action
against a deceased spouse's estate for negligent injury even though
the parties were living together as husband and wife at the time of
the injury.224  It certainly would not prevent a legal action against
one of the parties to compensate for a tort committed during cover-
ture225 or, for that matter, prevent a cause of action for an antenup-
tial tort 2" or a suit against the spouse's employer on the basis of
respondeat superior for the tort of one of the spouses.2 It is even
questionable whether it would prevent such a suit as was presented
in Lowman v. Lowman,28 in light of the fact that Chief Justice
Taft indicated that the wife could sue for an intentional or negligent
tort committed while she was living apart from her husband. 9
Nor would the syllabus appear in any way to prohibit a wife living
apart from her husband from suing him for invasion of privacy in a
factual situation similar to LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. 230
In none of these situations does the syllabus in the Lyons231 case
prevent a recovery, but the three "pillars" of family immunity -
domestic tranquility, fraud and collusion, and judicial legislation -
might well do so.
In the parent and child area, these four cases do not indicate
whether an emancipated child may maintain an action against a
22 2 Id. at 246, 208 N.E.2d at 536.
223 Id. at 243, 208 NXE.2d at 534.
224 Cases cited note 143 supra.
225 Cases cited note 146 supra.
2 2 6 Cases cited note 145 supra.
2 2 7 Cases cited note 144 supra.
228 Lowman v. Lowman, 166 Ohio St. 1, 139 N.E.2d 1(1956).
229 Id. at 9-10, 139 NX..2d at 6-7.
230 120 Ohio App. 129, 201 N.E.2d 533 (1963).
231 See Logan v. Reaves, 209 Tenn. 631, 354 S.W.2d 789 (1962).
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parent for injuries occurring while the child was unemancipated 2
Nor is there a clue as to whether an unemancipated minor child may
sue a deceased parent's estate for a negligently caused injury."
Furthermore, Ohio has not yet ruled on the status of a person
who stands in loco parentis. This latter question is .an important
one, considering the large number of children who are placed by the
court in foster homes throughout the state.2" 4
In addition, the four cases do not indicate what the Ohio Su-
preme Court's attitude would be in a suit by a parent against an un-
emancipated minor child.285 Probably in the case of small children,
the parents' own negligence in failing properly to supervise the
tortiously inclined child would be a factor in preventing any recov-
ery; however, most of the actions that have arisen in recent years
have involved older children injuring their parents while operating
motor vehicles.2 8 None of the four cases provides a due as to the
Court's attitude toward suits between siblings. Most of the more
recent decisions in other jurisdictions have allowed such actions,
although this very likely represents the minority view.
Two factors stand out about these four principal immunity cases.
First, they do not present typical factual patterns as compared with
other modern leading cases concerning intra-family immunities.
Such cases have involved automobile accidents in which the injured
party had been a passenger. Second, there is a striking unanimity of
the judges' opinions in the four cases. Only one of the twelve
judges who voted in these cases filed a dissenting opinion, and this
related to a procedural matter rather than to a disagreement with
the law enunciated by the majority opinion.28 Thus it would ap-
pear that the law relating to the particular facts of these cases is
settled.
However, in light of the many exceptions which have recently
been developed in intra-family law in other jurisdictions and in view
of the many questions which remain unanswered in Ohio, it is evi-
dent that there is much yet to be decided by the Ohio Supreme
Court in the field of intra-family immunity.
232 Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965).
23 Cases cited note 103 supra.
234 PROSSER, TORTS § 116, at 886 (3d ed. 1964).
235 Baits v. Balts, 142 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1966); Gaudreau v. Gaudreau, 215 A.2d
695 (N.H. 1965); Ertl v. Ertl, 30 Wis. 2d 372, 141 N.W.2d 208 (1966).
236 Ibid.
237 Cases cited note 104 supra.
2 38 Teramano v. Teramano, 6 Ohio St. 2d 117, 120, 216 N.E.2d 375, 378 (1966).
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